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GOYTIA v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Cal.

Cite as 464 P .2d 47

83 Cal.Rptr. 591
Rilth GOYTIA, Petitioner,
Y.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD and California Packing Cor-

poration, Respondents.
S. F.22676.

Workmen's compensation claimant
sought annulment, of decision after recon·
sideratian by Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board reducing her award of permanent disability benefits. The Supreme Court,
Tobriner, ]., held that where workmen's
compensation claimant had worked parttime for many years so that she, could remain at home with her children, but, ~fter
sustaining injury to wrist and hand resulting in permanent disability, and after two
o~ her children had married and the third
had entered last year of high school, she
obtain.ed full-time permanent. employment,
Board, in determining permanent disability
award, should have considered claimant's
ea~ning capacity as demonstrated by her
ability to hold a .full-time permanent job.
Decision of -Workmen's Compensation
Board annulled and case remanded for fur-

ther proceedings,

Traynor, C. J., McComb and Burke, JJ.,
diss~nted.

I. Workmen's Compensation

~1802,

consideration" of postinjury earnings, sllch
earnings should be discarded as inconclusive violated labor code provision requiring Board to specify in detail reasons for
the decision. West's Ann.Labor Code,
§ 5908.5.
3. Workmen's Compensation

Supreme Court of, California,
In Bank.
Jan. 30, 1970.
As Modlt!ed on Denial of Rebearing
Feb. 25, 1970.

-1821

Purpose of statute directing that any
decision of Workmen's Compensation Ap. peals Board affirming, rescinding or amending original award by Appeals Board or
referee following reconsideration shall
specify in detail reasons for decision is to
assist reviewing court to ascertain principles relied upon by lower tribunal to help
avoid careless or arbitrary action and to
make right of appeal more ,meaningful.
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5908.5.
2. Workmen's Compensation ¢;)182f

Detennination of Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board that after its "due

47

~19

W_ithin statute providing that if other
methods of arriving at average weekly earnings cannot be fairly applied, such earnings,
shall be taken at 95% of sum which reasonably represents -average weekly earning
capacity of employee at time of his injury,
due consideration being given to his actual
earnings, "earning capacity" is not restricted to actual earnings on date of injury but
contemplates employee's 'general over-all
capability. West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453
(d).
See publication 'Vords and Pbrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Workmen's Compensation ~840

Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board must consider postinjury earnings in
awarding permanent disability benefits.
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453(d).
5. Workmen's Compensation

~21

Where workmen's" compensation claimant had worked part-'time for many years
so that she could remain at home with her
children but, after sustaining injury to wrist
and h"and resulting in permanent disability
and after two of her children had married
and a third had entered last year of high
school, she obtained fult-time permanent
employment, Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, in determining permanent disability award;' should have considered
claimant's earning "capacity as demonstrated by her ability to hold a full-time permanent job. West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453
(d).

Morgan, Beauzay & Hammer and Robert
T. Bledsoe, San Jose, for petitioner-; Barry
Satzman, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae.
Everett A. Corten, Jon L. Gateley, San
Francisco, Edmund D. Leonard and Daw·
son B. -Leonard, Orinda, for respondents.
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TOBRINER, Justice.
Petitioner seeks annulment of a decision
after reconsideration by the Workmen's

ment record had demonstrated an earning

capacity equivalent to $81.90 per week for
purposes of permanent disability.

Compensation Appeals Board which reduced

The appeals board granted Del Monte's

her award of permanent disability benefits.
The appeals board, basing its determination

petition for reconsideration and thereafter
annulled the referee's decision. The board
found petitioner's earning capacity to be
minimum and awarded her permanent disability indemnity at the rate of $20 per
week. In its opinion the appeals board
stated its' reasoning: IIWe have carefully
reviewed the record in this matter. Applicant was employed by Del Monte in its
cannery operation. The evidence in the
record is that applicant worked seasonably
for about twenty years prior to the time of
her injury. Following her industrial injury she remained off work for some time
and then secured full-time employment be-

upon her pre-injury earnings, rated peti-

tioner's earning capacity for purposes of
permanent disability as minimum. We cannot ascertain from the ambiguous decision
of the board whether or not in so doing it
considered sllch earning capacity of petitioner as disclosed by earnings subsequent

to the injury; we believe that such consideration is required by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. We must therefore an-

nul the decision.
The petitioner, Ruth Goytia. sustained an
injury to her right wrist and hand on April

IS, 1966, while employed by the California
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
Corporation}. Prior to her injury petitioner had worked as a seasonal packing
house worker for the California Packing
Corporation for several years with sufficient earnings to entitle her only to the
minimum compensation rate of $20 per
week. Subsequent to her injury, in July
1967, petitioner obtained full-time permanent employment at San Jose Hospital as a
cashier, with earnings of approximately
$81.90 per week. Her earnings on her ful1time job sufficed to produce a compensation

rate of $50.57 per week.
About one year later, on July 22, 1968,
a referee for the appeals board held a hearing to -determine the extent of petitioner's
permanent disability resulting from her 1%6
injury. After a second hearing on November 7, 1968, the referee issued a rating of

15V2 percent, and on December 11, 1968,
he filed his supplemental findings and
award, including a finding that petitioner's
Ilearning capacity for purposes of permanent disability is $81.90 per week," awarding her permanent disability indemnity at
the rate of $50.57 per week. In his opinion
on decision the referee noted that prior to
her injury petitioner's earnings had been
minimum, but that her subsequent employ-

cause her children had grown older and no
longer needed her attention.

Section 4453

(d) of the Labor Code provides that the
average weekly earning capacity of the
injured employee shall be determined at the
time of his injury. At the time of her injury applicant's earnings were admittedly
minimum. We are therefore granting reconsideration to annul the finding that earnings were at the maximum rate, to find
applicant's earnings were at the minimum
rate and to correct the award accordingly."
At the threshold we must meet the contention of the appeals board in its answer to
the petition that its opinion shows that it
had "carefully reviewed the record in this
matter," that lithe evidence considered by
the Board included her [petitioner's] obtaining of 'full-time employment because
her children had grown older and no longer needed her attention'" and that it had
properly found applicant's earnings were at
the minimum rate. The opinion, however,
offers no such clear affirmation of the
board's position but presents alternative
possibilities, either of which is vulnerable.
The board's decision may rest upon the
proposition that the actual earnings of applicant at the date of -injury, and not her
earning capacity, determine the rate, and
that therefore "due consideration" to post-
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injury earnings need not be given. In that
event, as we shall explain, the_opinion misconceives Labor Code section 4453, subdivision (d). On the other hand, the opinion may represent the determination of the
board, after its "due consideration" of postinjury earnings, that such earr1ings should
be discarded as inconclusive. In that case,
the board's cryptic pronouncement, as we
shall show, violates section 5908.5 of the
Labor Code, 'Yhich requires that the board
/I * * * state the evidence relied upon and
specify in detail the reasons- for the decision."
[1,2} We first examine the second alternative. We repeat a proposition that th~s
court has stated on numerous occasions:
the board must observe the mandate of section 5908.5. Evans v. Workmen's Camp.
App. Bd. (1968) 68 CaI.2d 753, 68 CaI.Rptr.
825, 4-11 P.2d 633, carefully explains that
"Section 5908.'5 of the Labor Code directs
that 'Any decisidn of the appeals board
granting or denying a petition for reconsideration or affirming, rescinding, altering,
or amending the original findings, order,
decision, or award foUo'lI:ing reconsideration shall be made by the appeals board and
not by a referee and shall be in writing
* * * and shall state the e'Uiden;e relied
upon and specify in' detail the reasons for
the decision.' (Italics added.)" (P. 755.
68 CaI.Rptr. at p. 826, 441 P.2d at p. 634.)

This court then set fo~th the rationale for
its position: "The purpose of the requirement that evidence be stated and reasons
detailed appears analogous to that of the
requirement of section 1705 of the Public
Utilities Code that decisions of the Public
Utilities Commission contain sepat:ately
stated findings of the basic facts upon all
material issues. It is to assist the reviewing
court to ascertain the principles relied upon
by the lower tribunal, to help that tribunal
avoid careless or arbitrary action, and to
make the right of appeal or of seeking re...
view more meaningful. (Greyhot1nd Lines,
Inc. V. Public Utilities Com. (1967) 65 Cal.
2d 811, 813, 56 CaI.Rptr. 484, 423 P.2d 556.)"
(Evans v. Workmen's Camp. App.Bd., su464 P.2d-4

pra, 68 Cal.2d 753, 755, 68 CaI.Rptr. 825,
826, 441 P.Zd 633, 634.} Evans has been
specifically applied to situations similar
to the present one in Granado v. Workmen's Compo App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d
399, 406, 71 ~al.Rptr. 678, 445 P.2d 294,
and Lundberg v. Workmen's Compo App.
Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 440-441, 71 Cal.
Rptr.. 684, 445 P.2d 300.
Indeed, the instant case symbolizes the
vice of the neglect of the rule: in reading
the narrative account of applicant's work
history one cannot authoritatively tell
whether the board did or did not give any
consideration to the evidence of subsequent
earnings. The board's conclusionary statement does not suffice to inform this court
of its specific holding or the basis for it.
It offers no scintilla of reason for refusing
to fix the rate in accordance with petitioner's subsequent earnings, if it .did give
such earnings "due consideration," and
such omission is the more flagrant in view
of the statutory obligations of the board,
which we discuss infra.
The alternative construction of the
board's opinion, which appears to us the
more likely, is that it decided that the actual earnings of the petitioner at the date
of the injury determine the rate without
regatd to subsequent earnings. Thus the
board states that "At the time of her injury
applicant's earnings were admittedly minimum.'" That statement do-es not mention
petitioner's earning capacity at the time of
injury. Yet section 4453. subdivision (d),
fixes "the average weekly earning capacity" as the ·basis for determining permanent disability rating. Nevertheless, the
board states that petitioner's earnings "at
the time of her injury" being "admittedly
minimum," it "therefore" grants "reconsideration to annul the finding" as to earnings.
[3] Earning capacity is not locked into
a strait-jacket of the actual earnings of the
worker at the date of injury; the term contemplates his general over-all capability and
productivity; the term envisages a dynamic, not a static. test and cannot be com-
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pressed into earnings at a given moment
of time. The term does not cut "capacity"
to the procrustean bed of the earnings at
the date of injury. A comparison of the
first three subdivisions of section 4453 with
the fourth shows that the Legislature deliberately established earning capacity as
the test for the fourth subdivision as distinguished from the actual earnings for the
other three subdivisions. Section 4453 provides for the computation of both temporary and permanent disability indemnity.
Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) 1 relate to
,full-time employees, employees working
for two or more employers, and employment at an irregular rate, such as piecework
work on a commission basis. Each
of those subdivisions provide for computation of "average annual earnings for purposes of permanent disability indemnity"
based upon earnings prior to the injury.

or

Section 4453, subdivision (d), applicable
here, provides as follows: "Where the employment is for less than 30 hours per week,
or where for any reason the foregoing
methods of arriving at the average weekly
earnings cannot --reasonably and fairly be
applied, the average weekly earnings shall
be taken at 95 percent of the sum which
reasonably represents, the average weekly
earning capacity of the injured employee
at the time of his injury, due consideration
I. "In. computing nverl)ge annual earnings
for the purposes of temporary disability
indemnity only, the average weekly earnings shall be taken at not less than thirtyeight dollars amI forty-six cents ($38.46)
nor more than one hundretl seven dollars
and sixty-nine cents ($107.69). In computing average annual earnings for purposes of permanent disability indemnity,
the average weekly earnings shall be
taken at not less than thirty dollars and
seventy-seven cents ($30.77) Dar more
than eighty dollars anll seventy-seven
cents ($80.77). Between these limits the
average weekly earnings, except as provided in Sections 4456 to 4459, shall be
arrived at as follows: (a) "There the
employment is for 80 or more bours a
week and for five or more working days a
week, tbe average weekly earnings shall be
95 percent of the number of working days
a week times the daily earnings at the

being given to· his actual earnings from all
sources and employments." (Italics added.)
The language of the statute leads to two
conclusions: first, average weekly earnings under subdivision (d) differs from
average weekly earnings under the other
three subdivisions; subdivision (d) applies., "where the employment is for less
than 30 hours per week, or where for any
reason the, foregoing methods .. .. ..
cannot re~sonably and fairly be applied."
(Italics added.) Since the prior three subdiv,i.sions calculate average weekly earnings solely on the basis of prior earnings,
the statute apparently contemplated that
prior earnings are not the sole basis for
the. determination of earning capacity 'or
average weekly earnings under subdvision
(d).
Secondly, subdivision (d) s~ates that in
average weekly earning capacity the appeals board should give "due
consideration" to actual earnings "from
all sources and _employments." Pre-injury
_earnings constitute one factor, but not the
exclusive factor, in _determining such earnings. The subdivision in alluding to earning "capacity" must necessarily refer to
~arning potential which may not, and probably will not, be reflected by prior parttime earnings.
d~termining

time of the injury. (b) 'Vhere the employee is working for two or more employers at or about the time of the injury,
the average weekly earnings shall be
taken as 95 percent of the aggregate of
such earnings from all employments computed in terms of one week; but the
earnings from employments other than the
employment in which the injury occurred
shall not be taken at a higher rate than
the hourly rate Paid at the time of the
lDJury. (c) If the earnings are at aD irregular rate. such as piecework, or on a
commission basis, or arc specified to be
.by tbe week, month or otber period, tben
,the average weekly earnings mentioned in
subdivision (a) above shall be taken a8
95 percent of the actual weekly earnings
averaged for such a period of time, not
e:x;ceeding one' year, as may conveniently
be taken to determine nn average weekly
rate of pay." (§ 4453.)
. -___ _

GOYTIA v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
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In the important case of Argonaut Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 57 Cal.
2d 589, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 409, sometimes referred to as the "Montana" case,
this court has insisted upon a realistic
appraisal of earnings under subdivision (d).
There we considered the appli~"tion of the
subdivision in the case of fan applicant,
Montana, who prior to his injury had
worked intermittently over a period of
years as a construction laborer. We annulled an award of permanent disability
based upon a finding of maximum earning
capacity stemming solely from an unusually
high wage which Montana happened to be
earning at the time of injury. We stated
that "An estimate of earning capacity is
a prediction of what an employee's earnings
would have been had he not been injured.
.. * * In making a permanent award,
long-term earning history is a· reliable
guide in predicting earning capacity, although in a variety of fact situations
. earning history alone may be mislea,ding.
• • • [A]l! facts relevant and helpful
to making the estimate must be considered
[citations]. The applicant's ability to work,
his age and health, his willingness and opportunities to work, his skill and education,
the general condition of the labor market,
and employment opportunities for persons
similarly situated are all relevant." (Italics
added) (57 Cal.2d 589, 594-595, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 548, 371 F.2d 409, 412.)
[4] Although Argonaut did not involve
the specific question we face here, whether
the appeals board should .consider postinjury earnings in awarding- perm.a:nent di,sability, its language, emphasizipg the 'importance of determinirig true earning' capacity based upon ','all facts relevant ~~d
helpful" and recognizing that "earning history alone may be misleading," indicates
that post-injury earnings forth a legitimate
area for consideration in determining earning capacity. If, as in Argonaut, the board
may reduce an appraisal of earning capacity
based exclusively upon immediately pre-injury earnings because of the total history of
the applicant, it must by the same token possess the corollary power to take into account
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post-injury earnings in order to, increase
its appraisal of sllch earning capacity. In
equating capacity to earn with earnings at
the time of injury, the board's construction substantially conflicts with the precept
of Argonaut.
Other courts have applied the definition
of earning capacity as used in subdivision
(d). In Colonial Mut. Compensation Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941) 47
Cal.App.2d 487, 118 P.2d 361, the Court of
Appeal condemned the use of wages actually received during the preceding year
as the sole basis for determining a temporary disability award. The court stated:
"As will be noted, under the above provisions [section 4453, subdivision (d)] it
is the average weekly earning capacity at
the time of the injury which is the basis
for determining average weekly earnings,
which, in turn, provides the measure for
computing the disability payment; and
while it is doubtless the law that in determining the average weekly earning capacity at the time' of the injury, due consideration is to be given to earnings in the past,
such earnings are not the controlling factor
in determining earning capacity" (47 Cal.
App.2d 487, 490, ll8 P.2d 361, 363).
In Colonial the Court of Appeal quoted
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.
(1933) 130 Cal.App. 488, 491-492, 20 P.2d
372, and California. Casualty Indemnity
Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933)
135 :CaI.App. 746, 752, 27 P.2d 782, to the
effect,that "'average weekly earning capacity .
* * should be construed to
mean that the wages of the employee which
were :actually earned during the year, together with all the surrounding circumstances affecting his earning ability, should
be considered .in ascertaining a figure
which 'will reasonably represent his weekly
earning capacity. Capacity to' earn money
necessarily contemplates all the surrounding
circumstances and conditions disclosed by
the evi~ence which may indicate one's usual
and. ordinary ability to earn wages, including his physical ability, his natural talents,
his training, his opportunity to secure em-

*
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ployment, and the condition of his health' "
(47 Ca1.App.2d 487, 491-492, 118 P.2d 361,
363-364).
The appeals board itself has specifically
interpreted subdivision (d) to permit consideration of post-injury earnings. In Dole
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1966) 31 Cal.Comp.
Cases 41, writ denied, the employee, ,Pargaz,
injured himself in 1963 while working as a
part-time cannery worker. Pargaz had
previously worked from 1956 to 1959 fulltime for another employer. From 1959
until his injury, however, he' had 'worked
sporadically, his highest annual earnings
being $1,400 in 1963. The referee found
that Pargaz's employment was seasonal
and would have continued only four more
weeks

after

his

injury j

he

therefore

awarded Pargaz temporary disability at

$40 for four weeks and at the minimum rate
of $25 thereafter.
By the time of the hearing on permanent
disability in March of 1965, Pargaz had
obtained full-time employment as a school
custodian at a salary of $387 per month.
Thereafter the referee awarded Pargaz
permanent disability at the maximum rate
based upon his post-injury earnings. The
referee reported: "At the time of the industrial injury applicant was employed in
seasonal employment, and his earnings during the year prior to the injury, during
a portion of which time it is contended he
was unable to work, would not support a
.compensation rate for permanent disability
of maximum. However, subsequent to
injury applicant secured steady employment
at $387.00 per month. As he had sustained
permanent disability before securing such
employment, it is the Referee's opinion that
if in such disabled condition, he was able to
earn $387.00 per month, his earning capacity at the time of injury was undoubtedly
no less than that." (31 Cal.Comp.Cases
41, 42.)

The board denied reconsideration. The
employer sought a writ of review contending that the referee could not properly determine earning capacity at time of injury
by reference to earnings from post-injury

employment; therefore, Pargaz was entitled to compensation at the minimum rate.
The Court of Appeal denied the writ.
Likewise, in Esparza v. Regents of the
University of California (1966) 31 Cal.
Camp. Cases 433, the appeals board considered potential future earnings in determining earning capacity. There the applicant, who expected to receive his master's
degree within six months, suffered injuries
while working part-time as a student research assistant. The board, on reconsideration, found that the applicant, but for the
accident, would have received maximum
earnings after he obtained his degree. The
board, citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com, supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 21
Ca1.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 281, recognized its
obligation to predict the applicant's earning
capacity; therefore, it considered his training, employment opportunities in his field,
and his willingness to work, and concluded
that his earnings for purposes of permanent disability were maximum.
[5] In the instant case petitioner
worked part-time over a period of many
years so that she could remain at home with
her children. After her injury, however,
when two children had married and the
third had entered his last year of high
school, she obtained full-time, permanent
employment, thus demonstrating her willingness and ability to work at a job which
would justify more than minimum benefits .
The conditions which led petitioner to work
only part-time. thereby limiting her earnings, had ceased to exist. Accordingly, in
making its deterrriiration of her permanent
disability award, the appeals board should
have examined all of the relevant facts,
including petitioner's earning capacity as
demonstrated by her ability to hold a fulltiffi:e, permanent job. In the words of the
referee in Dole v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra,31 Cal.Comp.Cases 41, 42: "[I]f in
such disabled condition, * * * [she] was
able to earn * * * [$82 per week] * *
[her] "earning capacity at the time of injury was undoubtedly no less than that."

GOYTIA v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
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We conclude that we cannot support the
board on either of;its projected hypotheses.
If, under Labor Code section 4453, sl1bdivision (d), it gave "due consideration" to
petitioner's post-injury. earnings,' it 'has
faiJed to explain why it disregarded such
earnings, thereby violating -section _59085'
of the Labor Code. I f it based. its decision
solely upon' petitioner's actllal earnings at
the date of- injury, refusing to give "due
consideration" to'a showing of her earning
capacity by means of her post-injury earn·
ings, it has not followed the precept of subdivision (d), as demonstrated 'by logical
construction and supporting decisiot:J.s.
The -decision of the Workmen's Compen·
sation Appeals Board is annulled and the
case is remanded to that board for further
proceedings consistent with-the views herein expressed.
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support an award 'above the minimum com ..
pensation rate.: The Court's holding herein
that the board must give "due consideration" to post-injury earnings in the circumstances of this case includes by necessary
implication a holding that the board could
properly award compensation above the
minimum 'if, after consideration of post.
injury earnings, it determined that the
applicant's earning capacity at the time
of the inju~y was greater than that demon·
strated by her pre·injury work history.
The Court's construction of Labor Code
section 4453, subdivision (d), appears to me
to be inconsistent not only with the Ian·
guage of the section but with our decision
in Argonau_t: Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 589, 21 Cal.Rptr.
545, 371. P.2d 281. Furthermore, it invites
injured employees with a history of season·
al or part-time e'mployment to accept fullPETERS, MOSK and SULLIVAN,.J]., time employment prior to the hearing beconcur.
fore the referee in order to obtain a possible windfall at the expense of the carrier.
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The purpose of subdivision (d) is "to
I dissent.
equalize for compensation purposes the po.
The Conrt annuls the award in this case sitton of the full-time, regularly employed
on the ground' that the dedsion of the worker whose earning capacity is merely
board is ambiguous in failing to set forth a multiple of his daily wage and that
the evidenc'e retied on and the reason for of the worker whose wage at the time of
the decision, thus leaving' open the possi- the injury may be aberrant or, otherwise
bility that the board did not give,"due con- a distorted basis for estimating true earn·
sideration" to post-injury earnings but ing power." (Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Indus·
based the compensation rate solely on the trial Ace. Com., supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 594,
applicant's actual earnings at the time of 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 547, 371 P.2d 281, 283.
her injury rather than her earning ca- Italics added.) Thus, when a' regularly
pacity. Although the board's decision employed' worker for reasons beyond his
might well have been more explicit, I do' control, 'such as illness, strikes, lay offs,
not agree that the award must be annulled. temporary recession, or other factors af·
Nor do I agree that in this case' the board feeting the opportunity for full-time emmUst consider post·injury earnings. There ployment in his customary .occupation, is
is 'no evidence that the applicant ever receiving a wage at the time of his injury
sought employment on other than a part- that does not fairly reflect his earning
time seasonal basis prior to her injury. capacity as suggested by his work history,
It is therefore my opinion that evidence subdivision (d) permits the board to conof post·injury earnings from full-time eht- sider that history and other relevant in·
ploym.ent is irrelevant to a determination for~ation in determining his earning ca·
of earning capacity ~t the time of the in· pacity. Conversely, as we held in Argojury.
naut, if at the "time of his injury the worker
The applicant concedes that her employ· is' employed full-time as a permanent em·
ment history before her injury would not ployee, but his work history establishes
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that he has had irregular employment at
low wages over a long period of time and
the current employment' is only for the
duration of a particular job, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to
base a permanent disability· award solely
on the high wage he is fortuitously-earning
at the time of the injury. (57 Cal.2d at
589, 594, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 281.)
The present case should be governed by
these fnles. If an award may not be based
solely on a high wage fortuitously being
earned at the time of an injury when
there is a history of irregular, part-time
work becanse the wage at the time of the
injury is aberrant, it follows that where
there is no evidence of willingness to
accept other than seasonal or part-time

work 'prior to the injury, earning capacity
at the time of the injury cannot properly
be determined on the basis of post-injury
earnings from full-time employment in another occupation. An applicant's willingness and opportunities to work are relevant to his earning capacity. (Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 57
Cal.2d 589, 595, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d
281.) A worker who is not available for
full-time regular work or who chooses to
work seasonally limits his own earning capacity voluntarily by his unwillingness to
work when opportunities to do so are
available.
Subdivision (d) of Labor Code section
4453 requires that the average weekly
earnings nbe taken at 95 percent of the
sum which reasonably represents the average weekly earning capacity of the injured
employee at tlte time of the injury
* * *." (Italics added.) Post-injury
earnings of an' employee who became willing to accept full-time worl<. only after the
injury are not relevant to his earning
capacity at the time of the injury when
his willingness and availability were subject to self-imposed limitations. The cases
on which the majority opinion relies, for
the proposition that post-injury earnings
may be considered were not concerned with
post-injury earnings, but with factors other

than actual earnings existing at the time
of the injury. In Colonial Mut. Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1941)
47 Cal.App.2d 487; 118 P.2d 361, California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial
Ace. Com. (1933) 135 Cal.App. 746, 27
P.2d 782, and A~tna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1933) 130 Cal.App.
488, 20 P.2d 372, the question was the
earning capacity of an employee whose
earnings during the year prior to his injury had been low as a result of temporary
illness or other cause that prevented his
working during that year, but whose work
history demonstrated that he possessed a
significantly greater earning capacity. In
the Colonial case the conrt adopted the
reasoning of the two earlier cases that in
such circumstances Han amount based only
upon the average sum which he actually
received during that year, regardless of
the unusual conditions affecting his employment, would not fairly represent his
earning capacity." (47 Cal.App.2d 487, 491,
118 P.2d 361, 363. Italics added.) I agree
with that reasoning and with the result
in those cases. The holdings are entirely
consistent with section 4453, subdivision
(d), and with Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 21
Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 409. The Court's
extension of those cases to encompass
post-injury earnings in addition to factors
existing at the time of the injttry is un~
warranted. Nothing in those cases suggests that the court contemplated consideration of circumstances subsequent to the
injury in determining earning capacity.
Neither those cases, nor Argonaut, are
authority for the Court's holding herein.
Finally, Dole v. Industrial Acc. Com.
(1966) 31 Ca1.Comp.Cases 41, is distinguishable from the present case. The
referee's report and recommendation on
reconsideration in that case notes that the
employee had held full-time employment for
a three-year period fonowed by four years
of sporadic employment immediately prior
to the injury. He had been discharged
from the full-time employment because of
wage attachments. His employment at the
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time of the injury was seasonal and his
earnings would not support a maximum
award. He contended that he was unable
to 'work for a part of the year prior to his
tnJury. "Subsequent to injury applicant
secured steady employment at. $387.00 per
month. As he had sustained. permanent
disability before securing such employment,
it is the Referee's opinion that if in such
disabled condition he was able to earn
$387.00 per month, his earning capacity
at the time of injury was undoubtedly no
less than that." (31 Cal.Comp.Cases 41,
42.) There is no showing regarding the
reason the worker engaged in seasonal
employment over a four-year period. It is
a permissible inference that he was unskilled and ul).able to obtain full-time work:
Furthermore, he may have been prevented
by health from obtaining full-time work.
In sum, the case does not stand for the
proposition that a worker who is voluntarily unavailable for work except on a
seasonal basis for over twenty years is. en;.
titled to a maximum award because he obtained full-time employment for the first
time in his life after the injury. Esparza
v. Regents of the University of California
(1966) 31 Cal.Comp.Cases 433, is similarly
distinguishable. The board there took into consideration the willingness of the employee, who was a student, to work. He
had worked part-time during the semester
and full-time during his vacation. That
the Legislature contemplated application of
a standard acknowledging intent to obtain
full-time employment in the future for stu'""
dents is apparent from -section '445"5' l()f. the
Labor Code,1 whiCh requires that a :~~~l
manent disability award to 'a':':tnirtor: re'fleet
the earnings he probably would pave :received at age 21. It is 6b~ious that":different policy considerations apply to mhlors
,

.',

_:"

and students who because of age and the
necessity to complete their farnial education cannot undertake full-time employment.
Post-injury earnings may be- relevant to
the determination of earning capacity in
some circumstances. If an employee offers evidence that he was actively seeking
full-time employment or employment at a
higher wage when he was injured, the fact
that he later obtains such employment is
relevant to establishing his competency to
fill the desired position. Here, however,
the applicant had worked seasonally as a
cannery worker for more than twenty years
prIor to the injury. Only once 'had she
sought other employment. In 1958 she was
self-employed as an agent for a dry cleaner, but returned to seasonal cannery work
because her earnings were not enough.
Throughout the balance of her employment
career, from 1937 to the time of the injury
in 1966, she chose to' work on a seasonal
basis. There is no evidence in the record
from which it can be inferred that in 1966
the applicant was wi1ling and able to accept
full-time employment in her post-injury occupation or any other. Therefore, her
post-injury earnings are in no way relevant to her earning capacity at the time
of the injury.
No purpose would be served by annulling
the award to permit the board to prepare
a decision with recitals of evidence and'
reasons for the decision. There is no evidence upon which an award above the
minimum could be sustained.
I .would ~ffirm the aw'ard.

McCOMB and BURKE,

JJ., concur.

Rehearing' denied i
McCOMB
BURKE, JJ., dissenting.

and

I

I. "If the injured employee is, under" 2~
years of age, an'd bis incapacity is petma~L!'.
nent, bis average weekly earnings shall'be
tleemed, within the limits fixed in Section
4453. to, be the weekly sum which under
ordinary circumstances he would probabl;t
be able to earn at the age of 21 years,
in the occupation in which he was 'em-

ployed at tbe time of the injury or in any
OCcl1potion to which he would' reasonably
hove been promotell if he bml not been injured. If such probable earnings at the
age of 21 years cannot reasonably be determinell, his average weekly earnings
shall be taken at eighty dollars and
seventy·seven cents ($80.77.)"

